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Consumers often face decisions about whether to purchase products that are
intended to protect them from possible harm. However, safety products rarely
provide perfect protection and sometimes “betray” consumers by causing the very
harm they are intended to prevent. Examples include vaccines that may cause
disease and air bags that may explode with such force that they cause death.
Expanding research on betrayal aversion, this study examines the role of emotions
in consumers’ tendency to choose safety options that provide less overall protection
in order to eliminate a very small probability of harm due to safety product betrayal.
In five studies we find that betrayal aversion is reduced and safer alternatives are
selected when factors that dampen the emotional response to potential betrayals
are introduced or taken into account. These factors include changing the betrayal
from an action to an omission (study 1), introducing positive imagery (study 2),
introducing visual representations of risk (study 3), making the decision for another
rather than oneself (study 4), and intuitive thinking style (study 5).
Agrowing number of researchers have stressed the im-portance of examining the decisions consumers make
to protect their health and well-being (Chandran and Menon
2004; Hoffer and Peterson 1994; Menon, Block, and Ra-
manathan 2002; Thompson 2005). Many of these decisions
include an emotional element that may influence—if not
determine—the choices that people make (Drolet and Luce
2004; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Sunstein 2005).
Consider, for example, people who must decide whether
or not to purchase safety products and services that are
intended to protect them from possible harm. Car shoppers
decide whether to pay extra for antilock brakes and air bags
that may help them avoid or survive a crash. Patients decide
whether to seek vaccinations for themselves and their chil-
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dren that may protect them from disease. Outdoor enthu-
siasts consider sunscreens, flotation devices, and spray re-
pellants that may provide protection from skin cancer,
drowning, and unwanted outdoor intruders.
The standard economic analysis holds that people should
purchase these products if the total expected benefits of
owning and using them outweigh their total expected costs.
Such computations are difficult because most safety prod-
ucts do not deliver perfect protection and the risks of failure
are often unknown or task dependent. No one can say ex-
actly how much drivers who purchase antilock brakes de-
crease their risk of dying in an accident because the extra
protection these brakes provide depends on road conditions,
speed, tires, braking style, and so on.
A standard analysis is further complicated by the para-
doxical problem that some safety products may “betray”
consumers by causing the very harm they are supposed to
prevent. Air bags occasionally kill people who experience
survivable car crashes (Meyer and Finney 2005), vaccines
occasionally cause disease (Ellenberg and Chen 1997), and
even bear repellant occasionally attracts bears (Matthews
1999).
Koehler and Gershoff (2003) first examined how people
respond to safety product betrayals in a variety of contexts.
In one study, participants were asked to assume that they
were indifferent between two rental apartments, each of
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which was equipped with one of two smoke alarms. Next,
they learned that there were differences between the two
alarms. Some participants were told that in the event of a
nighttime fire due to the usual causes, occupants in the apart-
ment equipped with Alarm One had a 2% chance of dying
while occupants in the apartment equipped with Alarm Two
had only a 1% chance of dying. However, they were also
told that the wiring of Alarm Two was such that it sometimes
causes electrical fires that increase the risk of dying in a
nighttime fire by an additional 0.01%. In other words, Alarm
One was associated with a 2% risk of death and Alarm Two
was associated with a 1%  0.01% (betrayal) risk of death.
Most participants in this condition preferred the apartment
equipped with Alarm One even though they were nearly
twice as likely to die with this safety device. Koehler and
Gershoff (2003) explained this result as an aversion to the
risk that the smoke alarm would betray its implicit promise
to protect renters by causing the very harm that it was sup-
posed to guard against. When the 0.01% betrayal risk as-
sociated with Alarm Two was replaced by a mathematically
identical nonbetrayal risk, namely, an elevated risk of struc-
tural collapse, most people selected the alarm that was as-
sociated with the lower overall risk of death (1.01%). This
pattern of choices was observed for a large majority of
participants across a variety of scenarios and dependent mea-
sures.
It is not surprising that consumers consider the risk of
betrayal when choosing among safety devices. The mere
possibility of betrayal threatens the social order that enables
us to trust the safety infrastructure of our society, causing
intense visceral reactions and negative emotions toward the
betrayer (Koehler and Gershoff 2003). Unfortunately, these
strong negative emotions toward a potential betrayer may
also lead people to take unwise risks. For instance, one of
the most commonly cited reasons (21%) that people did not
intend to be vaccinated against H1N1 influenza was an un-
founded concern about contracting H1N1 from the vaccine
itself (Blendon et al. 2009).
What are the factors that might reduce safety product
betrayal aversion? The strong association between betrayal
aversion and negative emotions reported in Koehler and
Gershoff (2003) provides a starting point for this investi-
gation. Participants who were confronted with safety product
betrayal reported greater feelings of anger, resentment, anx-
iety, fear, sadness, and disgust compared to when there was
no safety product betrayal, both after a harm had occurred
(see study 4) and when faced with the risk of a potential
for harm (see study 5). If fear and other negative emotions
caused by a potential betrayal lead to avoiding a safety
product, then betrayal aversion may be reduced or elimi-
nated by introducing factors that dampen the negative emo-
tion consumers feel. Below we review evidence that emotion
plays a critical role in risky decision making in general and
in safety decisions in particular.
EMOTION AND BETRAYAL
BY SAFETY DEVICES
Research suggests that people rely on two distinct yet in-
teractive “systems” for decision making (Chaiken and Trope
1999; Epstein et al. 1996; Kahneman and Frederick 2002;
Pacini and Epstein 1999; Sloman 1996; van Gelder, de Vries,
and van der Pligt 2009). System 1 is an automatic, non-
deliberative system that quickly generates impressions of
available stimuli. It is the experiential or emotional system.
System 2 monitors the quality of System 1 impressions using
a more deliberative judgment process. System 2 is the an-
alytical or rational system.
Research on how people evaluate risky options points to
the importance of System 1 (the emotional system). Studies
show that people commonly make judgments and decisions
under uncertainty based on nonprobabilistic rules (Rotten-
streich and Kivetz 2006), visceral urges (Loewenstein 1996),
affective evaluations of stimuli (Baumeister et al. 2007; Fin-
ucane et al. 2000; Mellers et al. 1997; Slovic et al. 2005),
and gut feelings (Hsee and Weber 1997; Loewenstein et al.
2001; Slovic and Peters 2006; Weber and Milliman 1997).
Consider, for example, Loewenstein et al.’s (2001) risk-as-
feelings hypothesis. It argues that feelings such as worry,
dread, and fear drive decisions in ways that cannot be rec-
onciled with an analytical assessment of the underlying
risks. Identical risks may be treated differently due to dif-
ferences in feelings about available options or feelings pre-
sent at the time of evaluation. Thus, watching an anxiety-
provoking video prior to purchasing a new car can shift
preferences toward a safer car over one that is sportier and
more luxurious (Raghunathan and Pham 1999).
In light of the demonstrated importance of System 1 on
risky choice, we seek to reduce safety device betrayal aver-
sion by dampening the negative emotions caused by betrayal
risks. In a series of behavioral studies, we pursue this goal
by introducing various factors that are likely to promote a
more cognitive task appraisal.
EMOTIONAL INFLUENCES ON
BETRAYAL AVERSION
The first factor that we consider is inspired by research on
the omission and normality biases. The omission bias (some-
times referred to as the “actor effect”; see Zeelenberg, van
der Pligt, and de Vries 2000) is the tendency to react to
harmful actions more strongly than equally harmful omissions
(Baron 2008; Richard, van der Pligt, and de Vries 1996). The
normality bias is the tendency to react to bad outcomes that
arise from abnormal circumstances more strongly than
equally bad outcomes that arise from more ordinary cir-
cumstances (Prentice and Koehler 2003). These phenomena
are relevant to betrayal research because the conventional
betrayal risk is both an active and an abnormal risk. That
is, a safety device in the betrayal paradigm has the potential
to behave abnormally and may play an active role in causing
harm. However, safety devices may cause or allow harm in
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other ways. For example, a safety device could fail to func-
tion properly and thereby passively allow a harm to occur.
Alternatively, a safety device could function as it should,
but the device may yet be an agent of harm due to failures
elsewhere in the system. Because these alternative failures
do not involve both active and abnormal harms, there may
be less negative emotion stemming from them and so less
aversion to these types of potential failure despite identical
risk of harm. We examine this possibility in study 1.
A second factor is the imagery that accompanies the pre-
sentation and description of safety device choice. There is
evidence that affect-rich presentations that stir emotions pro-
mote a feeling-based evaluation of objects while affect-poor
presentations promote analytical evaluations. Hsee and Rot-
tenstreich (2004) studied the effect of such presentations on
people’s willingness to donate money to help save endan-
gered pandas. They found that when the number of pandas
to be saved was represented with affect-rich pictures of the
animals, people were insensitive to the actual number of
pandas being saved. This result is consistent with a feeling-
based approach to the problem. However, when the number
of pandas was represented as affect-poor dots, people made
more analytical evaluations that were sensitive to the number
of pandas. Similarly, in a study on factors that affect how
people view threats associated with crime and car accidents,
Berger (2007) found that presenting information in affect-
poor graphical or statistical form increased rational judg-
ments and decreased assessments of the seriousness of the
threats relative to affect-rich anecdotal accounts. We ex-
amine whether positive imagery and statistical graphs de-
crease betrayal aversion and associated negative emotions
toward potential betrayal in studies 2 and 3.
We also examine whether betrayal aversion can be re-
duced by changing the recipient of the safety device from
oneself to a stranger. This hypothesis fits well with anecdotal
evidence that doctors are less prone to rely on emotional
considerations when they are less emotionally involved with
their patients (Sepkowitz 2004), and with academic studies
that show that people make different choices for others than
they make for themselves (Kray 2000). In his remarkable
paper on the role of visceral factors in decision making,
Loewenstein (1996) suggests that people underestimate the
emotional responses of others, particularly when making
decisions for them. The implication of this observation for
our purposes is that emotion-laden risks, such as betrayal
risks, may receive less weight when the decision maker and
person who must live with the consequences of the decision
are different people. Research supports this position. Faro
and Rottenstreich (2006) and Hsee and Weber (1997) find
that the choices that people make for unknown others in
risky situations are more risk neutral than those that they
make for themselves. Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) argue
that this result arises from an “empathy gap” in which people
underestimate the impact of emotional considerations for
strangers, but not for themselves. We test the significance
of this self-other factor for betrayal aversion in study 4.
Study 5 examines the role that individual differences in
thinking style may play in betrayal aversion. Although there
is broad consensus in the psychological community about
the validity of the two-system model of reasoning described
previously (Kahneman 2003, 698), there is variability in the
extent to which people typically rely on each of the systems.
For example, in counterfactual thought, representativeness,
and framing problems, people who favor an experiential
thinking style are more likely to respond in a heuristic rather
than analytical manner (Epstein et al. 1996; Shiloh, Salton,
and Sharabi 2002). Because potential betrayal involves an
emotional reaction, we expect that people who favor a more
analytical style of thought will show less aversion to po-
tential safety product betrayal.
In short, four of the five studies reported here investigate
the effects of a variety of potentially emotion-dampening
factors on betrayal aversion. The fifth study examines in-
dividual differences. We take the reality of betrayal aversion
as a starting point, noting that it has been demonstrated by
Koehler and Gershoff (2003) in numerous scenarios, in-
cluding air bags, vaccines, smoke and fire alarms, and se-
curity guards. Throughout the studies presented here, we
use a focused approach and hold the betrayal scenario con-
stant (using the air bag malfunction scenario from Koehler
and Gershoff, studies 4 and 5), which places a greater pre-
mium on internal rather than external validity, in order to
increase our confidence in the interpretation of moderating
effects.
STUDY 1: TYPE OF BETRAYAL
Safety products may be associated with harm in different
ways. First, they may become agents of harm directly, as
when an air bag deploys with such force that it kills a car’s
occupants (CNN 1998). In those cases, the air bag fails to
act as it should and is the agent that actively delivers the
harm. Second, safety products may simply fail to provide
the expected protection and therefore be responsible for the
resultant harm in a more passive manner. Such failures pose
a significant public health concern (Reuters 2010). Third,
safety devices may act as they should and yet be agents of
harm due to failure elsewhere in the system. For example,
a defective steering column may move an air bag closer to
a driver, and the air bag may then become a proximate agent
of harm in an accident. Here the safety device is indirectly
responsible for the harm.
The air bag is associated with potential for harm in each
of the three cases above, although the cases differ in how
they violate expectations. Consequently, we hypothesize that
the cases also differ in amount of negative emotions and
correspondent betrayal aversion. The possibility that an air
bag may actively cause death is a clear violation of a con-
sumer’s expectations for the safety device. The possibility
that an air bag may fail likewise violates a consumer’s ex-
pectations but does not violate the consumer’s expectation
that the device will not cause harm in an otherwise safe
situation. Based on prior research that finds people have
stronger emotional responses to harms that arise from ac-
tions rather than inactions, we hypothesize less negative
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FIGURE 1
STUDY 1: TYPE OF POTENTIAL BETRAYAL ON PREFERENCE
FOR OVERALL LOWER RISK (1.01%) AIR BAG OPTION
emotion and less betrayal aversion to a passive safety device
betrayal versus an active betrayal. Furthermore, when a
safety device is the proximate agent of harm but has acted
precisely as it was designed to act (indirect betrayal), there
is a reduced sense in which the device has violated expec-
tations. We therefore hypothesize less aversion to the in-
direct betrayal than either the active or passive betrayals.
Method
One hundred and twenty individuals were each paid $3.00
for participating in study 1. Participants were recruited from
the general public from a paid participant pool at the Uni-
versity of Michigan. In all conditions participants were of-
fered a choice between two otherwise identical automobiles
equipped with different air bags (Koehler and Gershoff
2003). For one of the cars, participants were told that “sci-
entific crash tests indicate that there is a 2% chance that
drivers who are in a serious accident [in this car] will be
killed due to the impact of the crash.” This was the higher
overall risk option (2%), and it was not associated with any
risk of safety product betrayal. For the other car, participants
were told that “scientific crash tests indicate there is a 1%
chance that drivers who are in serious accidents risk death
due to the impact of the crash” and that drivers of this car
faced an additional “one chance in 10,000 (.01%) risk of
death.” This is the lower overall risk option (1.01%).
Three conditions varied the source of the additional
(.01%) risk. In the active betrayal condition the source of
the additional risk of death was described as due to a po-
tential action of the safety device, specifically, that “trauma
caused by the force of the airbag deployment” could kill
drivers and passengers who would not have been killed had
they selected the other car (Koehler and Gershoff 2003,
study 5). In the passive betrayal condition, the source of
the additional 0.01% risk was described as due to a potential
inaction of the safety device: “the airbag could fail to de-
ploy” allowing some drivers and passengers to be killed
who would not have been killed had they selected the other
car. In the indirect betrayal condition, the source of the
additional 0.01% risk was described as follows: “the engine
block may jam the steering column. This may force the
dashboard forward which may increase the forces of the
deploying airbag. This may kill drivers and passengers who
would not have been killed if their cars had been equipped
with the other airbag.”
Participants provided their preference between the two
cars in each condition on a 7-point Likert-type scale an-
chored with “Definitely prefer option A” at 1 and “Definitely
prefer option B” at 7. Next, participants were provided with
a subset of items from the PANAS Negative Affect Scale
(Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988), which was also used
in Koehler and Gershoff (2003). Participants used a 5-point
scale anchored by “Not at all” to “Extremely” to indicate
how strongly they expected to feel various negative emo-
tions (angry, afraid, jittery, sad) if they owned option B (i.e.,
the car with the lower overall risk air bag).
Results
A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences in
relative automobile preference depending on how the air
bag might fail (F(2, 118) p 19.37, p ! .001; see fig. 1).
As predicted, preference for the safer air bag (i.e., the 1.01%
overall risk option) increased as the betrayal associated with
the safer option became less acute. Thus, when the betrayal
was passive rather than active, people had a stronger pref-
erence for the safer option (M’s p 4.16 and 2.80, respec-
tively; t(118) p 4.40, p ! .01), and when the betrayal was
indirect rather than passive, people had an even stronger
preference for the safer option (M’s p 4.80 and 4.16, re-
spectively; t(118) p 1.99, p ! .05).
We combined the four negative emotion items into a sin-
gle measure (a p .92). A one-way ANOVA revealed a
main effect for type of failure (F(2, 118) p 9.18, p ! .001).
Planned comparisons showed that negative emotion for an
active betrayal (M p 2.18) is greater than for a passive
betrayal (M p 1.77; t(118) p 2.23, p ! .05) and negative
emotion for a passive betrayal is greater than for an indirect
failure (M p 1.32; t(118) p 2.17, p ! .05).
Discussion
Prior research showed that betrayal and exploitation of
trust is associated with strong negative emotions and a vis-
ceral desire to distance oneself from the offending agent
(Buunk 1982; Davis and Petretic-Jackson 2000; Medvec,
Valley, and Thaler 1999; Robinson and Morrison 2000).
Koehler and Gershoff (2003) found that this visceral desire
induces people to choose safety options that increase the
risk of the very harm they seek protection from. Study 1
extends the betrayal aversion phenomenon by showing that
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type of potential betrayal affects the emotional reactions
people have to safety options and that those reactions are
associated with degree of betrayal aversion. People appar-
ently experience less negative emotion when betrayals are
passive (i.e., the safety device fails to protect but does not
actively cause harm) or indirect (i.e., the safety device func-
tions properly but is nevertheless an instrument of harm due
to failure elsewhere in the system), and betrayal aversion is
correspondingly less acute.
These results suggest that betrayal and reactions to be-
trayal risk are not either-or phenomena. A safety product
may betray consumers in various ways and to varying de-
grees, and the resultant emotion and aversion will be cor-
respondingly graduated. In the remaining studies, we try to
dampen the negative emotions that may influence betrayal
aversion by introducing and/or measuring factors that are
external to the nature of the betrayal.
STUDY 2: IMAGERY
The affective components of a risky choice situation may
push consumers in the direction of evaluating available
choice options on emotional System 1 grounds rather than
analytical System 2 grounds (Chartrand, van Baaren, and
Bargh 2006). In one probability assessment study, partici-
pants were less likely to collect necessary data and more
likely to jump to conclusions following exposure to anxiety-
producing stimuli (Lincoln et al. 2009). Similar findings
have been reported in behavioral economics studies with
the “ultimatum game” (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Sanfey
et al. 2003). Andrade and Ariely (2009) found that 73% of
people who were made angry prior to playing the ultimatum
game (via a movie clip) rejected inequitable offers, but only
40% of people who were made happy rejected the identical
offer.
The emotional response to betrayal risk may operate sim-
ilarly. If so, then exposure to positive stimuli may reduce
the negative emotions associated with betrayal risk and
thereby weaken the betrayal aversion effect. We test this
hypothesis in study 2 by exposing participants to images
that are known to influence emotional states but that are
unrelated to the safety device choice task. We predict that
providing images that reduce people’s negative feelings will
interfere with emotion-based reasoning and increase pref-
erence for the lower overall risk safety option. Although
our focus is on identifying factors that reduce betrayal aver-
sion, the same logic suggests that images that increase neg-
ative feelings may exacerbate betrayal aversion.
Method
Two hundred and forty-six individuals were recruited
through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Although demograph-
ics were not collected from this sample, a pretest sample
of 158 participants was 53% female with a mean age of
35.5, ranging from 18 to 63 years old. Each was paid the
equivalent of $10 per hour. The study was a 2 (betrayal:
yes, no) #3 (imagery: negative, positive, none) between-
subjects design.
All participants read what was said to be an excerpt from
a consumer magazine article. The article described new fea-
tures in an automobile model, including two air bag options.
The air bag options were described much as they were in
study 1 (e.g., 2% risk vs. 1%  .01% risk). As in study 1,
the additional risk in the betrayal conditions was described
as due to “trauma caused by the force of the airbag de-
ployment.” The additional risk in the no betrayal conditions
was described as due to “causes other than the direct impact
of the crash.” We expected that participants would behave
rationally and show greater preference for the lower (1.01%)
risk air bag when there was no possibility that it would be
the cause of harm, regardless of images presented with the
choice.
An ad for a photo contest that would appear in the next
issue of the magazine appeared at the bottom of the page.
In the positive and negative image conditions, this adver-
tisement included six images. Images were selected from
the International Affective Picture System, a set of images
prescreened to produce specific premeasured emotional re-
actions (Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 2005). The positive
images included a child eating watermelon, a deer drinking
from a lake, a cow in a field, a family in a living room, a
church on a hill, and a butterfly on a flower. The negative
images included a dog baring its teeth, an armed robbery,
a sinking ship, a tornado, and an attacking snake. In the no
image control condition, no photos were displayed.
Participants read the excerpt and answered a question
about it to ensure task attention. Next, those in the positive
and negative image conditions used 5-point scales to rate
the images on four positive (joyful, safe, relieved, relaxed)
and four negative (afraid, angry, sad, jittery) emotions.
Then, on a separate page, participants used a 7-point scale
to indicate their air bag preference. Finally, participants es-
timated the amount of negative emotion (afraid, angry, sad,
jittery) they would feel if they owned the car that had the
lower overall risk (1.01%) air bag.
Results
Manipulation Check. We combined participants’ rat-
ings of the four positive emotions (a p .95) and four neg-
ative emotions (a p .93) toward the images to create one
positive and one negative emotional measure. An ANOVA
revealed a main effect for imagery on the positive emotion
measure, with images in the positive conditions rated more
positively (M p 3.34) than images in the negative condi-
tions (M p 1.13; F(1, 149) p 332.46, p ! .001). Imagery
ratings did not differ by betrayal condition, and there was
no betrayal # imagery interaction (all p’s 1 .10). Likewise
an ANOVA revealed a main effect for imagery on the neg-
ative emotion measure with images in the negative condi-
tions rated more negatively (M p 2.87) than images in the
positive conditions (M p 1.12; F(1, 149) p 175.12, p !
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FIGURE 2
STUDY 2: IMAGES AND POTENTIAL BETRAYAL ON
PREFERENCE FOR OVERALL LOWER RISK
(1.01%) AIR BAG OPTION
.001). Again, there was no main effect or interaction in-
volving betrayal (all p’s 1 .10).
Air Bag Preference. Figure 2 presents the mean pref-
erence ratings for the air bag alternatives. An ANOVA re-
vealed a main effect for potential betrayal, with greater pref-
erence for the lower overall risk air bag in the no betrayal
condition (M p 5.45) than in the betrayal condition (M p
2.98; F(1, 240) p 154.14, p ! .001). There was also a
significant betrayal # imagery interaction (F(2, 240 p
5.36, p ! .005). Follow-up contrasts showed that preference
for the safer air bag differed in the betrayal conditions (F(2,
117) p 7.62, p ! .01) but not in the no betrayal conditions
(F(2, 123) p 0.08, p 1 .10). In the betrayal conditions,
preference for the safer option was higher when positive
imagery was present (M p 3.84) than when no imagery
was present (M p 2.59; F(1, 85) p 12.00, p ! .001). The
presence of negative imagery in the betrayal conditions (M
p 2.58) did not affect preference for the safer alternative
relative to no imagery (F(1, 88) p 0.17, p 1 .10).
Emotional Reaction to Potential Betrayal. An
ANOVA revealed a main effect for betrayal on the aggre-
gated emotion measure (a p .90) with greater negative
emotions reported for air bags that have a potential to betray
(M p 1.77) compared to those that do not betray (M p
1.25; F(1, 240) p 33.46, p ! .01). Further, there was a
significant betrayal # imagery interaction (F(2, 240) p
5.94, p ! .01). When there was potential for betrayal, par-
ticipants in the positive imagery condition experienced less
negative emotion (M p 1.31) than participants in either the
negative imagery or control conditions (M’s p 2.02 and
1.96, respectively; F(2, 117) p 8.104, p ! .001). When
there was no potential for betrayal, there was no difference
in reported emotion across the three imagery conditions
(F(2, 123) p 0.47, p 1 .10).
Discussion
Study 2 is notable for two reasons. First, it replicated the
basic betrayal aversion effect. Participants strongly preferred
a higher risk option (2% chance of death) when the lower
risk option (1.01% chance of death) included a small risk
of betrayal. However, when the small risk of betrayal was
replaced by a mathematically identical nonbetrayal risk, this
choice pattern reversed. Participants showed greater pref-
erence for the normatively lower risk (1.01% chance of
death) option. Second, study 2 showed that exposure to
positive imagery decreased negative emotion and decreased
aversion to the low risk safety option that had a potential
to betray. This result is consistent with prior research that
showed an influence of emotional stimuli on decisions in-
volving safety and risk (Andrade and Ariely 2009; Hsee and
Rottenstreich 2004; Lincoln et al. 2009; Raghunathan and
Pham 1999).
Negative imagery did not increase aversion to the betrayal
option or negative emotional responses to it. The result may
be due to a ceiling effect: betrayal aversion is already so
prevalent that introduction of negative imagery does little
more than reinforce the evaluation of the alternatives that
would be observed without it. Alternatively, the specific
negative images used in this study may have been too weak
to arouse strong negative emotions and therefore did not
increase betrayal aversion. Regardless of which explanation
is true, the observation that positive images can affect both
consumers’ emotions and safety choice behavior supports
our thesis that a key to overcoming betrayal aversion lies
in dampening the negative emotion that betrayal evokes.
STUDY 3: CUES TO RATIONAL
PROCESSING
In study 3, we explore a related technique for dampening
betrayal emotion and betrayal aversion. Drawing on research
that shows that irrational judgments can be curtailed when
relevant data are presented with graphical support (Berger
2007; Bhasker and Kumaraswamy 1990; Kleinmuntz and
Schkade 1993; Liersch and McKenzie 2009), we consider
whether describing safety risks with the aid of graphics will
reduce emotional reactions to potential betrayal and en-
courage consumers to select the safer option. Using the air
bag scenario, we predict that providing a graphical display
of the risks associated with each of the potential air bags
will reduce emotional reactions and reduce betrayal aver-
sion.
Method
Two hundred and sixty-three individuals were recruited
from the University of Michigan paid participant pool, as
in study 1, and each was paid $2. The study used a 2 (be-
trayal: yes, no) # 2 (risk presentation: narrative, visual)
between-subjects design. The basic stimuli and dependent
measures were similar to those in study 2. Participants in
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the visual risk presentation conditions received an image
graphic that described the number of deaths expected out
of 10,000 for each of the air bags. There was a box above
the description of each air bag titled “Total deaths expected
in 10,000 serious accidents.” The option associated with the
2% risk contained an array of 200 tiny icons of skulls with
crossbones. The option associated with the 1.01% risk con-
tained an array of 101 skull and crossbones icons.
Results
Figure 3 presents mean preference ratings for the alter-
natives. Replicating study 1 and Koehler and Gershoff (2003),
there was a main effect for betrayal: participants showed
greater preference for the safer option when the additional
risk did not involve betrayal (M p 5.10) versus when it
involved betrayal (M p 2.96; F(1, 259) p 117.72, p !
.001).
There was also a betrayal # risk presentation interaction
(F(1, 259) p 4.49, p ! .05). Follow-up contrasts showed
that preference for the safer air bag differed in the betrayal
conditions as a function of risk presentation (t(129) p 3.24,
p ! .01). In the betrayal condition preference for the safer
option increased when the presentation included a visual
representation of the risks (M p 3.47) versus when it was
presented solely in narrative form (M p 2.54). In the no
betrayal conditions presentation format did not affect pref-
erence (t(130) p 0.45, p 1 .10).
An ANOVA revealed a main effect for betrayal on the
aggregated emotion measure (a p .91) with greater negative
emotion in the betrayal condition (M p 2.13) than in the
no betrayal condition (M p 1.41; F(1, 259) p 29.67, p !
.001). There was also a significant betrayal # risk repre-
sentation interaction (F(1, 259) p 7.86, p ! .01). When
there was potential for betrayal, participants in the visual
risk representation condition reported less negative emotion
(M p 1.86) than participants in the narrative risk represen-
tation condition (M p 2.36; F(1, 129) p 7.73, p ! .01).
When there was no potential for betrayal, there was no
difference in emotional reactions as a function of risk rep-
resentation F(1, 130) p 0.83, p 1 .10).
Discussion
Study 3 provides further support for the idea that factors
that dampen a decision maker’s negative emotions can re-
duce betrayal aversion. The data showed that presenting the
statistical information associated with a betrayal risk in a
graphical format leads to a more cognitive and a less emo-
tion-based evaluation of the available options. We observed
a reduction in both negative emotion and betrayal aversion
when we supplemented a risk narrative with a vivid graph-
ical display of the corresponding risks.
STUDY 4: SAFETY DEVICE RECIPIENT
People who give good advice often have trouble following
that same advice in their own lives. Research shows that
people of all ages rely on different attributes, and make
different choices, depending on whether they are advising
(or choosing for) someone else or making a decision that
affects themselves (Hsee and Weber 1997; Kray and Gon-
zalez 1999; Prencipe and Zelazo 2005). Faro and Rotten-
streich (2006) find that the choices people make for others
are more risk neutral than those they make for themselves,
a phenomenon they refer to as an “empathy gap.” If an
empathy gap is common in risky choice tasks, then safety
product betrayal aversion might be reduced by asking de-
cision makers to imagine that they are making safety product
choices for strangers. We anticipate that this technique will
dampen the negative emotions ordinarily experienced by
those who contemplate betrayal options and increase pref-
erence for the lower overall risk safety option.
Method
Ninety-two individuals were recruited from the University
of Michigan paid participant pool, and each was paid $3.
The study used a 2 (betrayal: yes, no) # 2 (safety device
recipient: self, other) between-subjects design. The basic
stimuli and dependent measures were similar to those used
in studies 2 and 3. The self-safety-device-recipient condi-
tions were identical to the control conditions in studies 2
and 3, with participants evaluating the alternatives as if they
were making a choice for themselves. In the other-safety-
device-recipient conditions, participants were told that they
had to choose one of the options for another (unnamed)
person in the study.
Results
Figure 4 presents mean preference ratings for the alter-
natives. There was a main effect for betrayal condition (F(1,
88) p 15.19, p ! .001). Participants showed greater pref-
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erence for the safer option (1.01% chance of death) when
the additional risk did not involve betrayal (M p 5.20)
compared to when it did (M p 4.11). There was also a
significant betrayal # safety device recipient interaction
(F(1, 88) p 4.30, p ! .05). In the self-safety-device-recipient
condition, there was a significant decrease in preference for
the safer alternative in the self-choice condition when it had
the potential to betray (M p 3.38) than when it did not (M
p 5.17; t(88) p 4.07, p ! .001). In the other-safety-device-
recipient conditions, we did not detect a significant decrease
in preference for the safer alternative as a function of
whether it did or did not have the potential to betray (M’s
p 4.69 and 5.24, respectively; t(88) p 1.26, p 1 .10).
Regarding the emotion measure, an ANOVA detected a
main effect wherein participants showed greater negative
emotion in the betrayal condition (M p 1.73) than in the
no betrayal condition (M p 1.37; F(1, 88) p 14.67, p !
.001). We also detected a significant betrayal # safety de-
vice recipient interaction that showed that choosing for an-
other person rather than oneself reduced the difference in
emotion in the betrayal and nonbetrayal conditions (F(1, 88)
p 14.17, p ! .001). In the self-recipient conditions, there
was greater negative emotion in the betrayal condition (M
p 2.04) compared to the nonbetrayal condition (M p 1.31;
t(88) p 2.74, p ! .01). But in the other-recipient conditions,
there was no difference in negative emotion as a function
of betrayal (M’s p 1.42; F(1, 88) p 0.01, p 1 .10).
Discussion
Participants in study 4 were less likely to be betrayal
averse when choosing the safety product for a stranger rather
than themselves. The reduction in negative emotions re-
ported by other-recipient participants versus the self-recip-
ient participants is also consistent with a conclusion that
other-recipient participants were more inclined to rely on
System 2 reasoning than were the more emotive self-recip-
ient participants.
This result implies that policy makers may be able to
minimize interference from the negative emotions that be-
trayal options cause by relying on scenarios that call to mind
the safety of strangers rather than the safety of oneself or
a loved one. This implication challenges the intuitive notion
that risk management professionals should recommend the
same options to their clients and patients that they would
recommend to a close family member or themselves.
STUDY 5: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
IN THINKING STYLE
Study 5 extends our examination of the role of emotion in
betrayal aversion by considering the role of individual dif-
ferences in reasoning style on safety product choices. Re-
search shows that some people rely more on experiential or
intuitive ways of thought (System 1) and others rely more
on analytical or rational approaches (System 2; Epstein et
al. 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999). Because those who tend
toward the experiential-intuitive mode are more likely to
invoke emotional and heuristic ways of thought (Epstein et
al. 1996; Shiloh et al. 2002), we expect that experiential
thinkers will react more strongly to potential betrayals and
be more likely to avoid them.
We operationalize experiential thought tendencies via
scores on a version of the Faith in Intuition (FI) component
of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al. 1996).
The FI scale measures the extent to which people rely on
feelings and intuitions to make judgments and decisions. We
predict greater betrayal aversion among those who tend to-
ward experiential-intuitive thinking. However, we do not
expect experiential thinkers to make different safety choices
than analytical thinkers when the betrayal element is re-
moved from the decision task.
Method
One hundred and thirteen people from the University of
Michigan student participant pool participated in study 5.
Each participant received extra course credit. Participants
completed the five-item Faith in Intuition Scale (FI). This
scale asks participants to indicate their degree of agreement
with statements like “I trust my initial feelings about people”
and “I believe in trusting my hunches.” After a filler task,
participants were randomly assigned to the betrayal or no
betrayal conditions of the air bag scenario and responded
to the usual dependent measures.
Results
As before, there was a main effect for betrayal: partici-
pants showed greater preference for the safer option when
the additional risk did not involve betrayal (M p 5.30)
versus when it did (M p 4.05; F(1, 111) p 22.00, p !
.001). Participants also indicated more negative emotion to-
ward the lower risk alternative in the betrayal condition (M
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p 1.72) than in the nonbetrayal condition (M p 1.22; F(1,
111) p 21.29, p ! .001). The five FI items were averaged
to create a single FI score (a p .82). We included this
measure in a regression along with an indicator variable for
betrayal condition and a betrayal # FI interaction term. In
addition to the main effect for betrayal described above, the
regression revealed a main effect for FI such that higher FI
scores were associated with greater preference for the safer
air bag option (t(1, 109) p 3.48, p ! .001). There was
also a betrayal # FI interaction (t(1, 109) p 2.49, p !
.05; see fig. 5). In the betrayal condition, higher FI scores
were associated with preference for the higher risk air bag
option (standardized beta p 0.49; t(1, 54) p 4.16; p
! .001). In the no betrayal condition, there was no effect of
FI on air bag preference (standardized beta p 0.09; t(1,
55) p 0.73; p 1 .10).
Discussion
We have argued throughout that betrayal aversion is
linked to the negative emotional response people experience
upon learning that an object of protection may become a
source of harm. If this is true, then we would expect people
who rely more on their experiential system to react more
negatively to a potential product betrayal. Study 5 found
this to be the case: those with higher Faith in Intuition (FI)
scores were more betrayal averse. However when the be-
trayal risk was replaced by an equivalent nonbetrayal risk,
the FI score did not predict safety preferences.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
When a safety product violates consumers’ trust by causing
the harm it is intended to prevent, people feel betrayed. In
earlier research Koehler and Gershoff (2003) showed that
the mere possibility of safety product betrayal conjures up
strong emotional reactions and some surprising avoidance
behavior identified as betrayal aversion, namely, a prefer-
ence for higher overall risk safety products compared to
lower-risk products that include a small chance of betrayal.
The present article extends this research by examining the
role that negative emotion plays in the production of be-
trayal-averse choices. We conducted a series of controlled
laboratory experiments in which we dampened and/or mea-
sured negative emotion in a safety device betrayal decision
task. These experiments consistently demonstrate that be-
trayal aversion is reduced when factors that dampen the
emotional response to potential betrayals are introduced or
taken into account. These factors include changing the be-
trayal from an action to an omission (study 1), introducing
positive imagery (study 2), introducing visual representa-
tions of risk (study 3), making the decision for another rather
than oneself (study 4), and intuitive thinking style (study
5).
Our research has implications for social policy makers
and health professionals. Various government agencies are
charged with protecting public safety and general welfare.
These agencies frequently issue safety standards on such im-
portant matters as seat belt usage in cars, helmet usage on
bicycles, and vaccinations for public school children (Fisch-
hoff 1984). Policy makers, who generally prefer alternatives
that maximize overall safety, need to be sensitive to the
possibility that members of the public will find some of
those alternatives emotionally repugnant. Indeed, large por-
tions of the public may act in ways that put them at increased
risk. Consider the 2009 worldwide outbreak of the H1N1
influenza virus. Although prestigious health agencies like
the Centers for Disease Control consistently recommended
vaccinating all children for this virus, polls showed that only
40% of American parents felt that H1N1 vaccination was
in their children’s best interests (Healy 2009). Approxi-
mately half of the parents who did not plan to vaccinate
their children expressed concern about betrayal-related ef-
fects, namely, the possibility that the vaccine itself could
cause illness. Our studies suggest that one way to align the
views of the general public with the recommendations of
public policy makers is to minimize the impact of negative
emotions and emotional reasoning on consumers. For ex-
ample, the expected death toll of children that do and do
not vaccinate could be represented in graphical form on
billboards and other public health advertisements.
Similarly, health professionals who provide treatment
plans for patients that include a risk of betrayal could be
taught to resist the invitation and urge to offer opinions about
how they would make the decision if they themselves were
the patient. Our research suggests that this may be the wrong
strategy for encouraging patients to attend to overall risks.
Instead, health professionals might be advised to retain their
neutrality and offer the same recommendations to their pa-
tients that they would offer to a stranger. Although such a
strategy may seem strange and antithetical to a personal
health care system, strangeness may be a small price to pay
for a decision strategy that increases the probability of a
favorable outcome.
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Of course, any strategic framing of information raises
ethical and normative issues (Slovic et al. 2005). On the
one hand, because all information must be framed in some
way or other, one could argue that it is too costly—or even
unethical—not to frame health and safety information in
ways that benefit the general public (cf. Thaler and Sunstein
2008). Advocates of this view treat betrayal aversion as a
judgment error that should be corrected (Sunstein 2005),
perhaps via some of the techniques described herein. We
accept the cost/ethics argument above but are not persuaded
by the normative claim (Koehler and Gershoff 2005). It is
one thing to present safety information and options in ways
that are likely to maximize societal benefits or minimize
overall harms. It is quite another to suggest that a consumer’s
safety product preferences (holding costs aside) should de-
pend entirely upon a comparison of the overall risks of the
focal harm posed by the available options. If the negative
consequences of safety product betrayals reach beyond the
immediate harm (e.g., by instilling within the general public
a deep mistrust of manufacturers and government safety
agencies), then one cannot say that consumers’ safety prod-
uct preferences should rely on probability of death com-
parisons alone. A rational person may justly believe that
eliminating the collateral damage that betrayals may cause,
including the emotional toll and damage to the social order,
is worth trading for a small increased risk of death.
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